[&:first-child]:overflow-hidden [&:first-child]:max-h-full"
Представившийся итальянцем гражданин Индии обманул россиянкуБрачный аферист из Италии попытался обмануть россиянку
。heLLoword翻译对此有专业解读
:first-child]:h-full [&:first-child]:w-full [&:first-child]:mb-0 [&:first-child]:rounded-[inherit] h-full w-full
Системы ПВО сбили еще два БПЛА на подлете к Москве14:52
^ Defenders of the Palsgraf perspective often insist that, under the principle in Palsgraf, the defendant must treat the plaintiff carelessly (or otherwise wrongfully) only under some abstract and generic description. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 17, at 165 (“In the Palsgraf case, for instance, it does not matter whether the defendant foresaw the danger to the plaintiff, Mrs. Palsgraf, as a specific and identified person . . . .”); see also John Oberdiek, The Wrong in Negligence, 41 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1174, 1181–82 (2021) (predicating tort liability on the breach of a duty of care “owe[d] [to] another individual, whether named or described generically,” id. at 1181). Even those who reject the Palsgraf perspective, in various respects, sometimes suggest such a view. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 17, at 152 (“Obligations of reasonable care . . . are relations between and among representative persons, with respect to the kinds of dangers that we might reasonably foresee happening.”). For a precise articulation of this generic understanding of the Palsgraf principle, see Jed Lewinsohn, “I Didn’t Know It Was You”: The Impersonal Grounds of Relational Normativity, 59 Noûs 191, 194–96 (2025).